

INSPECTOR GENERAL

76-2037

6 MAY 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Lehman

SUBJECT : Draft Reply to Bill Bundy

1. I realize that my bias shows in the following comments and you have to take this into account, but it seems to me the general tone of the paper is too negative and apologetic. I confess never to having been too impressed with our political NIE's in the "good old days" and was even less impressed with the impact of "Eastern Academia." In addition, I believe there are other serious defects.

2. I strongly believe the paper is remiss in two significant aspects, both associated with S&T.


- It fails to tell Bundy that, as a portion of the significant CIA and Community output, NIE's and other papers dealing with scientific findings, technological developments and their input to national defense studies have increased greatly in numbers and importance since his time. Thus it is necessary that we also look at our association in this area with "academia". The leaders in these fields are not at Harvard, Princeton or Yale but at MIT, Michigan, Texas, Cal Tech, etc. Also important in these areas are the various research institutes, think tanks, and private research firms. In all these areas the CIA association with the leaders in S&T is extensive and generally excellent.
- If it is granted that S&T contributes an important part from an analytical viewpoint in the total CIA output, such analytical expertness is closely tied to a sequential series of S&T activities:
 - CIA sponsored research
 - CIA sponsored technical developments

- The use of these developments in technical means of collection
- Technical spillover into the DDO area, such as in better communication, improved sensors, bugs, etc.
- This package is so tied together that the separation of the DDO from the rest of the Agency is, in my view, unthinkable. A related point is that much of this kind of work goes on at research institutes, think tanks, academic centers, and private research firms and in many cases is the basis for the strong, high-level association that underlies our analytical effort in these fields.

3. Other points that I believe should be considered are:

- The present draft does not make a compelling case for organizational togetherness in the sense that, for instance, one can assert that the DDO operator and the DDI analyst provide better mutual support because they are both in CIA than the DDI analyst and the NSA collector do because they are organizationally and geographically separated. In any event, a further separation of the DDO from the DDI and DDS&T would not improve their relationships. Mr. Bush might tell Mr. Bundy that his (Bush's) problem in this area is not to strive for further fragmentation of the components of the Intelligence Community for marginal and questionable gains and a clear loss of the present degree of cooperation and interdependence, but to seek ways to build a greater sense of community in the Intelligence Community as a whole toward the end of the greater effectiveness and increased cooperation between all of its components.
- The sentence on page 6 referring to "the personality and policies of the next President" can be easily interpreted to mean that Mr. Bush anticipates a change of President next January. Whatever his personal views may be, I don't believe he should say this in this letter. Suggest that the 7th and 8th lines be rewritten "depend more on the personalities and policies of the Administration than on anything we do in intel - " In the same vein, the reference to a "bruising political campaign" on page 8 may be mis-

- Suggest that the last sentence on page 9 end the reply on a more positive note. Suggest that Mr. Bush tell Bundy that he will actively seek ways to improve the currently extensive and fruitful interchange between academia and the Agency, that he appreciates Bundy's interests and concerns, and that he would hope that Bundy would continue to advise and aid him in efforts to improve our national intelligence capabilities.
- Some mention might be made in our reply to Bundy that the DDI has a Coordinator of Academic Relations, who is actively seeking ways of improving and extending our analytic contacts with academia.



Donald F. Chamberlain
Inspector General

STAT

D
R
A
F
T

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000700120002-5

D
R
A
F
T

Dear Bill,

Some days ago I promised you a reply to your thoughtful letter. It has taken longer than I expected because the concern you express inspired me to ask for a review of our situation.

Your thesis as we understand it is that the overt, analytic side of the Agency should be organizationally divorced from the clandestine. This would open the door to a reestablishment of close links between intelligence analysis and the intellectual resources of the universities. Confronting this, we have asked ourselves four questions. What is the present state of these relationships? What improvements could be achieved by the divorce you propose? What would be its costs? Would the costs be worth the gain?

Let me say at the beginning that I can only agree with you that the intelligence profession does not stand well in what you call the "mainstream" of American thought. That said, however, it must also be said that our problem is much narrower in one sense and much broader in another than you imply.

It is narrower because the opposition in principle to clandestine operations is aimed mainly at covert action, and is confined to a relatively small but highly articulate and influential group. These critics are strongest in the major universities,

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000700120002-5

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000700120002-5
and strongest there in the Establishment ones. With a few exceptions, they represent the liberal arts and social sciences rather than the physical sciences, and within the social sciences they do not include many scholars of Communist societies. [On the other hand,] your "mainstream" strongly influences the editorial (and the news) content of certain familiar publications which are able to build a sort of prison of fashionable attitudes. When we deal with the currents of intellectual life outside prison walls, we find a great deal of support for the Agency and its mission.

On the other hand, the problem is much broader than intelligence. The "mainstream" has, to varying degrees, turned its back on defense and on foreign policy. A few will have nothing to do with government itself. A much greater number believe, with some justification, that our national energies should be concentrated on domestic problems. Their concern over intelligence issues is obviously great, partly because of the lurid way in which these issues are presented, and partly because these issues epitomize for them the misdirection of American society. Nonetheless, it is more an expression of a broader legitimate debate over priorities and credibility, than the underlying cause of the debate. We are convinced that acceptance by these people of the Agency, or of its present analytic component, as a respectable participant in American intellectual life must wait until they rediscover that guilt is no substitute for foreign policy in a less than benign world, and until they determine that it is respectable to participate and assist in national government. There are some encouraging signs that this is beginning to happen.

Even then, I concede, we will have problems, but not as great as you anticipate. The fact is that we have never been isolated from academia even during the worst of the recent period. In fact, we are less "monastic" now than we have ever been. The difference is that many of the people with whom we deal find it necessary to be circumspect if they are not to be hounded by the emotional and the trendy among their colleagues. For this reason you and many others are probably unaware just how deep and extensive these relationships are. They require, ~~for example,~~ the assignment of an officer full-time as Coordinator. Some examples, from the liberal arts and social sciences, at the risk of inflicting on you a statistic or two:

-- You speak of the immense amount of contact that "used to exist" between the overt side and the universities. Our Office of Political Research (formed when ONE was broken up) alone has maintained through all the nastiness of the past few years regular and active exchange:

- ° At Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, MIT, Amherst, etc., with 39 senior faculty;
- ° At Chicago, California, Michigan, etc., with 41 senior faculty;

° At other institutions (including six foreign) with 32 senior faculty.

- You asked how long it has been since a scholar from the outside joined the Agency for a year or so. The answer is that there are two such on board now, and a third is about to join us.
- You note that our people used to be able to go freely to academic centers. This academic year we have 21 analysts on sabbaticals at various universities. Well over a hundred others, openly identified as CIA, have attended 60 professional meetings (American Political Science Association, etc.) and 30-40 presented papers or were scheduled as discussants.
- OPR and the Offices of Economic and Strategic Research all have panels of distinguished scholars to review their output and their programs. Many of these people put in a good deal of time at Langley.
- During the past two years, the Agency conducted 3 symposia to bring intelligence analysts together with academic

leaders in the development of new methods of analysis in the social sciences. The first dealt with a broad range of new methodologies, the second and third with the specific problems of elite analysis and national leadership succession. Nearly 50 scholars from almost as many major universities participated. CIA sponsorship of the symposia was openly revealed, but only one person invited hesitated because of that association.

-- We have a summer intern program for graduate students. This year we will take 74, one out of every nine applicants. Experience suggests that about half will end up as permanent employees.

I think it is in the long run much more important that we are making a major effort to break our product out of its security wrappings. There is already a respectable flow of unclassified or declassified CIA product to the academic world. We expect it to grow.

On the scientific side, by now at least as important as the traditional intelligence disciplines, our relations with the universities have always been close. In recent years our activities in science and technology have grown enormously. A great deal of

our analytic work is directed at technological developments and weapon characteristics. Similarly, we are deeply involved in research and development in support of collection and information processing, not only in the obvious areas like photography but also in the integration of technology with clandestine collection.

We draw for these purposes on the full range of American intellectual resources, and few scientists have withheld cooperation. We have contracts with more than 35 senior scientific faculty at major universities, and that many more serve as consultants. Among them are some of the country's most distinguished, including several Nobel laureates. Moreover, we draw on, and depend on, the work done at these institutions, and at research institutes and think ~~th~~anks. We have full membership in the American scientific community. X

In our experience, all but the most hysterical of faculty and students are sophisticated enough to make a distinction between the overt and analytic and the covert and operational, however much they may disapprove of the latter. While our analysts on campus have a great deal of arguing to do, they are not held responsible by their academic colleagues for clandestine activities in which they have not themselves been engaged.

Nor has recruiting suffered. We have far more exceptional applicants than we can take. Many of those that have joined us in recent years are extraordinarily impressive, not only in academic terms but also in professional or military experience. Neither you nor I are in a position to compare these officers with those of

whom you speak, but my colleagues who know both groups tell me our newer people measure up. You are quite right, however, that we are not getting from Harvard and Princeton the liberal arts graduates at the top of their classes. I wish we were, but the fact is that in the 70's these people are simply not interested in federal service of any kind.

Academic stars aside, the general level of our professional force is much higher today than it was in the 50's. The proportion with graduate degrees (and from first-rate universities) has risen from about 20 to about 45 percent, while the number with no degree has dropped from 35 (!) to 5 percent.

The mass and often indiscriminate intake of professionals in the 50's will not be repeated. It provided many first-rate people, but it also saddled the Agency with a large number of third-raters. Virtually all of these have been eased out in the last few years. With a smaller but steady intake, we are able to be highly selective, a policy that is paying off in the depth of talent and experience available to us.

Adding this all up, we assess our academic relationships not to be in bad shape, especially when we consider the strains to which they have been subjected by largely irrelevant events. Obviously they can be improved. In particular we want to have the very best people from the very best schools competing to join us, and we would prefer that our associates on the campuses did not have to worry over the effect their association might have on their students or their peers. A divorce from the Clandestine Services

might help, at least in the latter instance, but its effect on recruitment or on our ability to broaden our present substantive exchanges would be marginal. Any positive change must await fundamental change in the fashionable view of what an intellectual owes to his country, something which we in intelligence can influence very little.

What do we lose by separation of analysis from operations? In our view, a great deal. It is interesting that the Senate Select Committee and its staff opened hearings largely convinced that there should be a divorce and ended, grudgingly, much less convinced. Its recommendation (pp. 449-451, copy attached) finally was that the new Oversight Committee should "give consideration" to this idea. Its objective, moreover, was primarily to relieve the DCI of a potential conflict of interest. The Harvard University Institute of Politics, Study Group on Intelligence Activities, produced a paper on this subject which is also quoted in the Select Committee's report (pp. 521-532, copy attached). I think the Study Group has the equities about right, especially in the dangers of placing the DDO in State or Defense, or of trying to maintain it in an independent position.

I would put even more weight, however, on the interdependence of the Operations, Intelligence, and Science and Technology Directorates. As you remember, the linkage between the analyst and the clandestine collector was ⁵one_A tenuous indeed. It is still not as close as we would like it, but year by year it improves.

In your letter you treat only with the substantive contribution that the collector can make. I think you downplay far too much the value of lengthy, on-the-scene immersion in a nation's politics, but there is an even more important consideration. We desperately need clandestine collection, but it is complicated and dangerous. We cannot afford to have it operate in a vacuum if it is to operate with reasonable efficiency and minimum risk. It must therefore be closely linked to the analysis function. The greatest value of this relationship, however, comes from the contribution of the analyst, not of the collector. The collector learns from the analyst what sources to seek and what questions to ask. He gets a continuous evaluation of his product. The analyst in turn gets a clear picture of the reliability and access of sources, and he can ask the follow-up questions. Thus, the collection process can be steered to make it more responsive to national requirements, and to make the ultimate product substantially more reliable.

I spoke earlier of the integration of technology and clandestine collection. The scientist who develops an advanced sensor, the clandestine officer who emplaces it, and the analyst who depends on its success are all members of a single team. Experience with NSA has shown how much the efficiency and responsiveness of collection suffers when it is organizationally and geographically separated from analysis. In the broadest sense, I see my managerial job is to make the Intelligence Community more "communal," to seek

greater integration and cooperation among all its components. Fragmentation is not the answer.

In sum, we come out with different answers from yours on the four questions posed earlier. First, our external relationships in this country, while hardly ideal, are not in bad shape. Certainly they have not been so damaged that radical surgery is essential. Second, we doubt that the surgery you propose would cure the patient; our particular difficulties are symptoms of a more general malady. Third, we rate the costs and risks of the operation considerably higher than you do. Finally, as we add these answers up in May 1976, the costs do not seem worth the gains.

One additional point. I think you will find that the concept of an analytic function independent of policymaking is firmly lodged in doctrine. Our officers from top to bottom take it seriously indeed. Had I any mind to change it, I would lose our best people by platoons. Nor are they unaware that they have no monopoly on knowledge and wisdom. They are encouraged to face outward, to seek information and advice wherever it may be had, and to engage in informed debate with their lay colleagues. And this exchange, even in these harried times, continues to be fruitful.

I do not wish to appear complacent, however. We have not had time to assess the impact on the public of the Select Committee's report. Its treatment of our relationships with academia has already produced some negative noises in academic circles. In any case, there is no question that the nation's confidence in

its intelligence service has been shaken; restoration of that confidence is my highest priority, and I will do whatever seems needed.

For now, our emphasis is on seeking greater understanding in the Congress and the press. After a few months, we will take another look. If organizational measures look sensible, we'll take them. As you point out, these are not things to be rushed at.

Again, many thanks for your letter. As you can see, we take these questions seriously. And it is healthy that we can debate them seriously with our distinguished alumni. I hope we can count on your continued advice and assistance.

Sincerely,

STAT

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000700120002-5

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000700120002-5